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ABSTRACT
The central building block of secure and privacy-preserving Vehic-
ular Communication (VC) systems is a Vehicular Public-Key Infras-
tructure (VPKI), which provides vehicles withmultiple anonymized
credentials, termed pseudonyms. These pseudonyms are used to en-
sure message authenticity and integrity while preserving vehicle
(and thus passenger) privacy. In the light of emerging large-scale
multi-domain VC environments, the efficiency of the VPKI and,
more broadly, its scalability are paramount. In this extended ab-
stract, we leverage the state-of-the-art VPKI system and enhance
its functionality towards a highly-available and dynamically-scalable
design; this ensures that the system remains operational in the
presence of benign failures or any resource depletion attack, and
that it dynamically scales out, or possibly scales in, according to
the requests’ arrival rate. Our full-blown implementation on the
Google Cloud Platform shows that deploying a VPKI for a large-
scale scenario can be cost-effective, while efficiently issuing pseu-
donyms for the requesters.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In Vehicular Communication (VC) systems, vehicles beacon Coop-
erative Awareness Messages (CAMs) periodically, at a high rate,
to enable transportation safety and efficiency. Vehicle-to-Vehicle
(V2V)/Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) (V2X) communication is pro-
tected with the help of Public Key Cryptography: a set of short-
lived anonymized certificates, termed pseudonyms, are issued by a
Vehicular Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI), e.g., [7], for registered
vehicles. Vehicles switch from one pseudonym to a non-previously
used one towards message unlinkability as pseudonyms are per se
inherently unlinkable.
With emerging large-scale multi-domain VC environments, the
efficiency of the VPKI and, more broadly, its scalability are para-
mount. Deploying a VPKI differs from a traditional PKI in different
aspects. One of the most important factors is the dimension of the
PKI, i.e., the number of registered ‘‘users’’ (vehicles) and the multi-
plicity of certificates per user. According to the US Department of
Transportation (DoT), a VPKI should be able to issue pseudonyms
for more that 350 million vehicles across the Nation [1]. Consider-
ing the average daily commute time to be 1 hour [1] and a pseu-
donym lifetime of 5 min, the VPKI should be able to issue at least
1.5 × 1012 pseudonyms per year1 , i.e., 5 orders of magnitude more
than what the largest current PKI issues (10 million certificates per
year [10]).
Each vehicle is expected to interact with the VPKI regularly,
e.g., once or a few times per day, not only to refill its pseudonym
pool, but also to fetch the latest revocation information. As shown
in [5, 7], the performance of a VPKI system can be drastically de-
graded under a clogging Denial of Service (DoS) attack: adversaries
could compromise the availability of the VPKI entities with spuri-
ous requests. The cost of unavailability2 is twofold: security (degra-
dation of road safety) and privacy. An activemalicious entity could
prevent other vehicles from accessing the VPKI to fetch the latest
revocation information. Moreover, signing CAMs with the private
keys corresponding to expired pseudonyms, or the Long TermCer-
tificate (LTC), is insecure and harms user privacy. Even though
one can refill its pseudonym pool by relying on other anonymous
authentication primitives, e.g., [8], the performance of the safety-
related applications could be degraded if the majority of vehicles
leverage such schemes, i.e., causing 30% increase in cryptographic
processing overhead in order to validate CAMs [8].
In this work, we leverage and enhance the state-of-the-art VPKI
towards a highly-available, dynamically-scalable, and fault-tolerant
(highly-reliable) design to ensure that the system remains oper-
ational in the presence of benign failures or any resource deple-
tion attack (clogging DoS). Moreover, we show how to dynami-
cally scale out, or possibly scale in3, based on the workload on the
VPKI system, so that it can comfortably handle any demanding
loadwhile being cost-effective by systematically allocating/deallocating
resources.
2 VPKI as a SERVICE (VPKIaaS)
We leverage the state-of-the-art VPKI system [7] that provides
pseudonyms in an on-demand fashion: each vehicle ‘‘decides’’when
to trigger the pseudonym acquisition process based on various fac-
tors [6]. Pseudonyms have a lifetime (a validity period), typically
ranging from minutes to hours; in principle, the shorter the pseu-
donym lifetime (τP ) is, the higher the unlinkability and thus the
higher the privacy protection that can be achieved.
The VPKI consists of a set of Certification Authorities (CAs)
with distinct roles: the Root CA (RCA), the highest-level authority,
1Note that this number could be even greater by considering the envisioned vehicular
ecosystem, i.e., pedestrian and cyclist being part of the Intelligent Transport Systems
(ITSs) with a gamut of services, e.g., Location Based Services (LBSs).
2Note that the VPKI could be unreachable for other reasons, e.g., intermittent cover-
age of sparsely-deployed Roadside Units (RSUs), that are orthogonal to this investiga-
tion.
3Scaling in/out, termed horizontal scaling, refers to replicating a new instance of a ser-
vice, while scaling up/down, termed vertical scaling, refers to allocating/deallocating
resources for an instance of a given service.
<b>Kubernetes Master</b>
Kube-apiserver etcd Kube-scheduler
kube-controller-manager
Node Controller Endpoints Controller
Replication Controller
LTCA RC PCA RC RA RC
Images
Container Registry
Kube-proxykubelet Docker
Container Resource Monitoring
Pod
LTCA
Pod
PCA
Pod
RA
Kube-proxykubelet Docker
Container Resource Monitoring
Pod
LTCA
Pod
PCA
Pod
RA
Kube-proxykubelet Docker
Container Resource Monitoring
Pod
LTCA
Pod
PCA
Pod
RA
Figure 1: A high-level VPKIaaS architecture.
certifies other lower-level authorities; the Long Term CA (LTCA)
is responsible for the vehicle registration, the Long Term Certifi-
cate (LTC) issuance, as well as (authorization) ticket issuance, used
for obtaining pseudonyms. The Pseudonym CA (PCA) issues pseu-
donyms for the registered vehicles and the Resolution Authority
(RA) can initiate a process to resolve and revoke all pseudonyms
of amisbehaving vehicle. Vehicles can cross into other domains [9];
trust between two domains can be established with the help of
an RCA, or through cross certification between them [9]. The effi-
ciency and robustness of the VPKI system is systematically investi-
gated in [6, 7] and the VPKI can handle large workloads. A detailed
protocol description can be found in [5, 7].
Towards ensuring viability as VC systems grow, we deploy the
VPKI on the Google Cloud Platform (GCP) (cloud.google.com), and
evaluate the availability, reliability, and dynamic scalability of our
scheme under various circumstances. Fig. 1 illustrates a high-level
abstraction of the VPKIaaS architecture on a managed Kubernetes
cluster (kubernetes.io) on GCP.4 A set of Pods will be created for
each micro-service, e.g., LTCA or PCA, from their corresponding
container images, facilitating their horizontal scalability.When the
rate of pseudonym requests increases, theKubernetesmaster, shown
on the top, schedules new Pods or kills a running Pod in case of
benign failures, e.g., system faults or crashes, or resource depletion
attacks, e.g., a DoS attack. The Pods could be scaled out to the num-
ber set in the deployment configuration, or the amount of available
resources enabled by Kubernetes nodes.
Each Pod publishes two types of metrics: load and health. The
load metric values are generated by a resource monitoring service,
which facilitates horizontal scaling of a micro-service, i.e., upon
reaching a threshold of a defined load, replication controller repli-
cates a new instance of the micro-service to ensure a desired Ser-
vice Level Agreement (SLA). Health metric ensures correct oper-
ation of a micro-service by persistently monitoring its status: a
faulty Pod is killed and a new one will be created. In our system,
we defined CPU and memory usage as the load metric. In order to
monitor the health condition of a micro-service, dummy requests
(tickets for LTCA micro-services and pseudonyms for PCA micro-
services) are queried (locally by each micro-service).
Note:Multiple replicas of amicro-service interact with the same
database to accomplish their operations, e.g., all replicas of PCAs
interact with a single database to validate an authorization ticket
4The RCA entity is assumed to be off-line, thus not included in the architecture.
and store information corresponding to the issued pseudonyms.
This could be a bottleneck in our architecture, possibly a single
point of failure; how to mitigate this would be part of our future
investigation. Moreover, the information corresponding to the is-
sued pseudonyms is stored asynchronously, i.e., a PCAmicro-service
delivers the pseudonym response without confirmation of its suc-
cessful storage in the database. If there are multiple replicas of
a micro-service, e.g., a PCA, a ‘‘malicious’’ vehicle, repeatedly re-
questing to obtain pseudonyms, might be provided withmore than
a set of pseudonyms per ticket.5 As future work, we plan to uti-
lize alternative storage solutions, e.g., NoSQL databases, and apply
zonal resource synchronization to prevent issuing multiple pseu-
donyms per ticket, thus fully mitigating the vulnerability.
3 DEMONSTRATION
In this work, we demonstrate three scenarios: pseudonym acquisi-
tion using Nexcom vehicular On-Board Units (OBUs) (S1), Pseudo-
nym acquisition for a large-scale urban vehicular mobility dataset
(S2), and the performance of the VPKIaaS system, notably its high-
availability, robustness, reliability, and dynamic-scalability (S3). For
the first two scenarios, our metric is the end-to-end pseudonym ac-
quisition latency, measured at the OBU side. For the last scenario,
we aim at demonstrating the performance of our VPKIaaS system
by emulating a large volume of workload. For each scenario, the
authors (presenters) will explain the underlying concepts behind
different components of our scheme along with the achieved re-
sults.
Experimental setup: We created and pushed Docker images
for LTCA, PCA, RA, and MySQL to the Google Container Reg-
istry (cloud.google.com/container-registry/). Isolated namespaces
and deployment configuration files are defined before Google Ku-
bernetes Engine v1.9.6 (cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine) clus-
ter runs the workload. We configured a cluster of three Virtual
Machines (VMs), each with eight vCPUs and 10GB of memory. To
emulate a large volume of workload, we created another Kuber-
netes cluster of four VMs (in a different data center), each with
10 vCPUs and 10GB of memory. Our full-blown implementation
is in C++ and we use FastCGI [4] to interface Apache web-server.
We use XML-RPC (xmlrpc-c.sourceforge.net) to execute a remote
procedure call on the cloud. Our VPKIaaS interface is language-
neutral and platform-neutral, as we use Protocol Buffers (develop-
ers.google .com/protocol-buffers) for serializing and de-serializing
structured data. For the cryptographic protocols and primitives (El-
liptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and TLS), we
use OpenSSL with ECDSA-256 public/private key pairs according
to the ETSI (TR-102-638) and IEEE 1609.2 standards; other algo-
rithms and key sizes are compatible in our implementation.
3.1 S1: Pseudonym Acquisition by an OBU
Fig. 3.a shows two Nexcom vehicular OBUs (Dual-core 1.66 GHz,
1GBmemory) from PRESERVE project (www.preserve-project.eu),
which support IEEE 802.11p. In this scenario, we consider one of
them to be an RSU, connected to the VPKI via Ethernet. The second
OBU requests pseudonyms from the VPKI via the ‘‘RSU’’ and the
communication is over IEEE 802.11p.
5This vulnerability is also relevant to the ticket acquisition process.
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Figure 2: (a) Nexcom boxes from the PRESERVE project,
used in S1. (b) LuST Topology [3], used in S2.
3.2 S2: Large-scale Pseudonym Acquisition
Fig. 3.b shows the LuST [3] scenario topology, a full-day realis-
tic mobility pattern in the city of Luxembourg. We use OMNET++
(omnetpp.org) and the Veins framework to simulate this large-scale
scenario using SUMO. In our simulation, we placed 100 RSUs in a
region (50KM × 50KM). Each vehicle requests pseudonyms for its
actual trip duration and V2I communication is IEEE 802.11p.
Fig. 3.a illustrates the CDF of the actual end-to-end latencies for
obtaining pseudonyms with different pseudonyms lifetimes (τP )
during the rush hours (7-9 am and 5-7 pm). For example, with
τP = 1 minute, 95% of the vehicles are served within less than
286 ms. Fig. 3.b shows the average end-to-end latency with dif-
ferent pseudonyms lifetimes. Obviously, the shorter the τP , the
higher the workload on the VPKI, thus the higher the end-to-end
latency. The results confirm that our scheme is efficient and scal-
able: the pseudonym acquisition process incurs low latency and it
efficiently issues pseudonyms for the requesters.
3.3 S3: VPKIaaS Performance
In this scenario, we aim at demonstrating the performance of our
VPKI, notably its reliability and dynamic scalability. To emulate a
large volume of workload, we generated synthetic workload with
up to 14 containers with 1-4 vCPUs and 1-4 GB of memory. Each
container generates 80,000 requests in the span of one hour lever-
aging 16 threads. One pseudonym request encapsulates 100 Cer-
tificate Signing Requests (CSRs) according to the standard (ETSI
TR-102-638 and IEEE 1609.2). Fig. 4 shows how our VPKI system
dynamically scales out/in according to the rate of pseudonym re-
quests. The numbers next to the arrows show the number of PCA
Pods at a specific system time.
We achieve a 5-fold improvement over prior work [2]: the pro-
cessing delay to issue a pseudonym for [2] is 20 ms, while it is
approx. 4 ms in our system. Moreover, unlike the VPKI system
in [2], our implementation supports dynamic scalability, i.e., the
VPKI scales in/out based on the arrival rate of pseudonym requests.
4 CONCLUSION
Paving theway for the deployment of a secure and privacy-preserving
VC system relies on deploying a special-purpose VPKI. However,
its success requires extensive experimental evaluation, to ensure
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
End-to-End Latency [ms]
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
0.95
1.00
C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
τP= 0.5min.
τP= 1min.
τP= 3min.
τP= 5min.
τP= 10min.
100 200 300 400
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
0.95
(a)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Pseudonym Lifetime [min.]
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
A
ve
ra
ge
E
n
d
-t
o-
E
n
d
L
at
en
cy
[m
s]
(b)
Figure 3: (a) End-to-end latency for pseudonym acquisition.
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Figure 4: Dynamic scalability of the VPKIaaS.
viability (in terms of performance and cost). We leverage the state-
of-the-art VPKI and show its availability, resiliency, and scalability
towards a cost-effective VPKI deployment.
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